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Abstract:  
This paper investigates the direction of causality between bank business model and the quality of 
loan portfolio using a large sample of US banks. We employ the panel causality testing 
approach, developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), and new technique of optimal lag 
selection of Hans et al (2017). Empirical results show that there is evidence of two-way causality 
between diversification and non-performing loans. 
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Bank plays an important role in the economy when serving as a channel through which 
disruption in its smooth functioning may lead to negative impacts on the real economy (Tran et 
al. (2019)). In the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) with the failure of a large 
number of banks around the world and the consequent economic recession in many countries, 
many criticized the dark side of functional diversification. Banking deregulation since early 
1970s that enables the casino-style gambling on Wall Street, allowing banks to move toward 
highly volatile and complex non-traditional banking activities. Regulators since then are moving 
toward structural changes in banking regulation, including the scope of bank business model 
(Gambacorta and van Rixtel (2013)). This demonstrates these non-traditional banking activities 
lead to higher riskiness in banks. In line with this view, these financial institutions need to turn 
back to their traditional activities. 
 However, whether from the theoretical or empirical perspectives, the question on the 
effects of diversification on the quality of bank loan portfolio remain a conflicting debate among 
scholars. On the one hand, under the perspective of the modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 
(1952)), an incorporation of different activities will reduce the total risk of bank, thanks to the 
generated co-insurance effect (Brewer (1989), DeYoung and Roland (2001), Gandhi, Kiefer, and 
Plazzi (2016)). As bank reduce the share of interest incomes over the net operating incomes, 
banks earn more non-interest incomes and at the same time experience less interest risk and 
credit risk. Furthermore, Diamond (1984) shows that in the absence of conflicts between 
borrowers and banks, banks that engage in different activities may improve the credibility in 
their loan-making decisions and in their borrowers’ monitoring by overcoming information 
asymmetry between depositors and borrowers (Tran et al. (2019)). Different studies support this 
argument such as Eisenbeis and Kwast (1991), Boyd, Chang, and Smith (1998), DeYoung and 
Torna (2013) for US banks sample or Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser (2010), Sanya and Wolfe 
(2011) with an international sample.  
 One the other hand, some may argue that by moving toward non-traditional banking 
activities, banks may experience a decrease of the quality of their loan portfolio. Diversification 
may lead to an intensified agency problem due to the increased size and consequently bank 
opaqueness, leading to discretionary decisions to undertake value-decreasing investments 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995). Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find banks may benefit 
from diversification gains, but these gains are quickly offset by increased exposure to non-
interest activities. De Jonghe (2010) documents the increased tail beta of diversified European 
banks, particularly during times of turmoil. Recently, Tran et al. (2019) provide an update 
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assessment of the effects of diversification on the non-performing loans of banks, and show that 
the loan portfolio quality of banks decreases with the moving toward non-traditional banking 
activities, and these findings are partially explained by the agency problems. 
Although there exist a large literature examining the effects of bank business model to 
bank risk, to the best of our limited knowledge, most studies only focus on a unidirectional 
causality running from the diversification to bank risk. However, some may argue that high risk 
appetite banks may choose to engage into non-traditional banking activities which are considered 
riskier, leading to self-selection bias (Tran et al. (2019)). Surprisingly, this causal direction is 
usually ignored in earlier studies. Our study aims to fulfill this gap, by providing an investigation 
on the possibility of a two-way causality between bank business model and the quality of loan 
portfolio. Earlier works usually impose various assumptions during the estimation process such 
as slope homogeneity or cross-sectional independence, and do not deal with causality in a 
systematic fashion, which may lead to incorrect causal inferences (Bai and Kao (2006)), and 
consequently conflicting research results depending on the time periods and sample selection. 
Some studies employ GMM method to control for the problem of endogeneity arising from the 
dependent and independent variables, however, GMM method is still under the assumption of 
slope homogeneity.  
 To circumvent this challenge, we use Granger causality techniques on panel data. The 
standard causality test defined by Granger (1969) widely applied in the empirical literature of 
financial development. Due to the characteristic of our panel data, we use more specifically the 
Granger non-causality test for panel data models extended by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). 
This method requires stationary data and can be used in case of cross-sectional dependency. 
Moreover, we apply to new technique of optimal lag selection extended by Han et al (2017) for 
robustness result.  
Following prior literature (Zhang et al. (2016), Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas (2012), 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006), Tran et al. (2019), Tran, Hassan, and Houston (2019)), we measure 
banks’ diversification using the ratio of non-interest incomes over net operating incomes (NIII) 
and use the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) as a proxy of the quality of bank’ loan portfolio. 
We document that there is evidence of diversification Granger-causing non-performing loans, 
and also evidence of non-performing loans Granger-causing diversification.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in different ways. First, unlike previous 
studies, we employ a novel technique - the Granger causality techniques on panel data. This 
approach is novel to the banking literature, and has advantages to compare with techniques 
usually employed in prior literature. Since it does not assume the homogeneity of the panel data 
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which is difficult to satisfy in a panel data, the test for Granger-causality can be performed on 
each individual panel member separately. However, since contemporaneous correlation is 
allowed across banks, this approach makes possible to exploit the extra information provided by 
the panel data setting. To the best of our limited knowledge, there is no attempt to incorporate 
the hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence in the literature on the diversification and bank risk 
profile. In this study, we also choose the optimal lag for dynamic panel data developed by Han et 
al (2017). This methodology corrects the sensitive result of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) with 
the different lag chosen. Second, we demonstrate there are two-way causality between bank 
business model and the quality of loan portfolio. Finally, to correct the potential endogeneity 
concern, we investigate the dynamic OLS (DOLS) developed by Kao and Chang (2000), the 
estimation confirms our hypothesis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the technical 
issues related to the Granger non-causality on panel data methodology. Section 3 provides 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes our study.  
2. Data, variables, and methodology 
To shed light our research question, we use a large sample of US bank holding companies 
(BHCs) with assets from $150 million and over. The data range covers the period of 2003:Q2 to 
2013:Q4. All banks with incomplete or missing (quarter) data are excluded. We also exclude all 
banks with negative or nonexistent outstanding loans or deposits. To reduce the effects of 
outliners, we winsorized all variables at 1% level on their distribution’s top and bottom.  
Our variables of interest are the diversification which is measured by the ratio of non-
interest incomes over net operating incomes (NII) (Stiroh and Rumble (2006), Tran et al. (2019), 
Tran, Hassan, and Houston (2019)) and the quality of bank’s loan portfolio as measured by the 
ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) (Zhang et al. (2016), Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas (2012), 
Tran, Hassan, and Houston (2019)). 
The test of Granger non-causality of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) requires on 
heterogeneous panel data with fixed effects and stationary variables. Moreover, they extend the 
standard causality test in the panel data that allow for the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence. The Granger non-causality relationship between the diversification and non-
performing loan is estimated as follow:  
             ∑    ( )               ∑    ( )                  (1)  
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             ∑    ( )               ∑    ( )                  
where NPLis non-performing loan ratio; NII is non-interest income over the net operating 
income.     is individual effects. i = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,T is cross-section unit and time period of 
the panel data. K is the lag order identical for all cross-section units of the panel. 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) propose to test the homogeneous non-causality (HNC) 
hypothesis that is the homogeneous non causality hypothesis from x to y. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis, indicating that there is a causality relationship from x to y for at least one cross-
section unit. The HNC Wald statistic associated with this test is computed by the average of 
individual Wald statistic:  
            ∑         (2) 
Then,      and  ̃    statistics are calculated to test the HNC test. The      is used for 
large N and T samples,      √     (         ); whereas the approximated value   ̃    is 
applied for finite T samples,  ̃    √                             (         ) 
However, Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) did not present the methodology finding optimal 
lag in the HNC estimation. Hence, it leads the sensitive result with lag selection. Generally, the 
best model is chosen by minimizing of Akaike information or Bayesian information criteria 
(BIC). However, Stone (1979) proved the inconsistent of BIC due to the presence of incidental 
parameter whereas Moon et al. (2007) demonstrated that these criteria information are 
inconsistent in dynamic panel models. Han et al. (2017) proposed new information criteria to 
choose optimal lag in dynamic panel which is called the Modify Bayesian information criteria 
(MBIC).2 Therefore, we apply the latter extension in this study.  
The MBIC is computed based on an autoregressive model AR(k): 
     ∑                  (3) 
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    ( )    ( ̂ )      (√ (   ))√ (   )  (4) 
 
where  
 ̂     (   )∑ ∑  ̂                (5)  ̂           ̂       ;       (             )    (       )  
For robustness and control for the problem of endogeneity, we estimate the long run 
relationship between NPL and NII by Dynamic OLS (DOLS) regression thanks to its 
outperforming over other models.3 DOLS is relevant to OLS and FMOLS because it allows us to 
correct the standard pooled OLS for serial correlation and potential endogeneity.  
The DOLS estimator requires the lead and lag in order to obtain unbiased results (Kao 
and Chang, 2000), and following fixed effect panel regression in general:                  
where     is a matrix 1x1,   is a kx1 vector of the slope parameters,    is the fixed effects, and     are disturbance terms.     is assumed to be a matrix kx1 integrated processes of order one for 
all i, where:               
 
Then, the DOLS estimator will take the following form:                              
where     is the coefficient of lead and lag. In this paper, we use Akaike information criterion for 
determining the optimal lead and lag. And in our estimation, x, y are represented by NII and NPL 
respectively.  
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3.1 Preliminary tests 
In this section, we verify some preliminary tests including the homogeneity panel data, the 
presence of cross-sectional dependence, panel unit root. After having validation of these tests, we 
will find the optimal lag by using MBIC, then we will test the HNC non-causality relationship of 
banking business model and quality of loan portfolio.  
First, we apply Hsiao (2003) approach to perform the heterogeneous test for panel data. 
The null hypothesis is homogeneity panel data against the alternative hypothesis of 
heterogeneous panel data. Recall that a homogeneous panel data model is a model in which all 
parameters including constant and slope coefficients are common. Hence, there are three cases 
for testing homogeneity panel data such as slopes and intercepts simultaneously homogeneous, 
slopes are the same, and intercepts are the same. The results are shown in the Table 1, indicating 
that we reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity panel data the panel data at the 1% level for the 
three cases. These results confirm our panel data is heterogeneity significantly at the 1% level. 
Second, we verify the presence of cross-sectional dependence in our panel data by 
applying Pesaran's CD test (Pesaran, 2004). The null hypothesis is no cross-sectional 
dependence. The results in Table 2 show that we reject the null hypothesis of no-cross sectional 
dependence, confirming that the presence of cross-sectional dependence of the panel data 
Third, we perform a series panel unit root tests introduced by LLC, IPS and ADF.4 The 
null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root. The panel unit root tests are shown in Table 
3 for both variables in level. Both variables are stationary at the 1% level.  
3.2 Main results 
In this section, we provide the optimal lag for each regression, then we perform the HNC non-
causality tests between banking business model and quality of loan portfolio in aggregated level, 
and in cross-section. 
In order to find the optimal lag, we choose four lags as the lag maximum due to the 
suggestion of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) who demonstrate that the lag order K must satisfy 
the condition of the size T-K must be larger than 5 + 2*K. We compute MBIC for each lag, and 
the minimum MBIC corresponds the optimal lag. Results in Table 4 suggest that one lag is the 
optimal lag selection for two-way causality.  
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 LLC, IPS and ADF tests represent by panel unit root test of Levin, Lin and Chu; Im, Pesaran and Shin; Maddala 
and Wu  
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Thanks to presence of cross-sectional dependence, we apply the bootstrap simulation 
with 1000 replication to create the criteria values of        ̃    and P-value for HNC test. The 
HNC non-causality relationship results are reported in Table 5. The results show that the banking 
business model (NII) and the quality of loan portfolio (NPLR) do Granger-cause in two way for 
at least one cross-section unit (bank). Therefore, we continue to investigate the causality 
relationship in each cross-section unit, and present in Table 6. We document that there is also 
two-way causality for 29 banks. This result confirms at least the causality in cross-section. 
However, different from these 29 banks, there are also some banks that exits the one-way 
causality between NII and NPL.  
For the control the endogeneity, our estimation using DOLS are performed in Table 8. 
Before regression, we verify the existence of cointegration by using Westerlund test that take 
into account the presence of cross-section dependence. The null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
The results of Westerlund tests are shown in Table 7. It shows that 3/4 tests reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. Thus, there is cointegration between NPL and NII, suggesting 
that we can estimate for the long run estimation of between NPL and NII.  
Table 8 presents that the coefficients of NII and NPL are negative and significantly at the 
5% level. This point suggests that there is evidence of diversification Granger-causing the 
decreased quality of loan portfolio on the one hand, and on the other hand, evidence of non-
performing loans Granger-causing diversification.  
4.Conclusion 
The question on the relationship between bank business model and their loan portfolio quality 
has long remained an important issue of debate in the banking literature, especially after the 
global financial crisis where many blame the casino-style gambling of Wall Street. We examine 
the direction of causality among these variables in question for a long period from 2003 to 2013 
for a large sample of US banks. Our novel point is to employ the recently proposed panel 
causality testing approach which takes into account cross-sectional dependence across banks. 
The method used in this study is the recently proposed panel causality testing approach which 
takes into account cross-sectional dependence across banks. The empirical findings suggest the 
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Table 1: Homogeneity panel data 
Null hypothesis:  F-statistic 
Slopes and intercepts simultaneously homogeneous 8.950*** 
Slopes are the same  3.336*** 
Intercepts are the same 18.164*** 




Table 2: Cross sectional independence 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence Pesaran's statistic 
NPL NII 840.114***[0.0000] 





Table 3: Panel unit root 
Test NPL NII 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -7.66189*** -44.6275*** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.28489*** -50.6070*** 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square (Maddala &Wu (1999)  1032.55***  4569.09*** 
   
Notes: optimal lag is chosen by Schwarz information criterion ; ***, **, * indicate significance 




Table 4: Optimal lag based on Hans et al. (2017) 
Lag NII  NPLR NPL  NII 
1 -3.866 7.339 
2 -3.847 7.370 
3 -3.823 7.401 
4 -3.801 7.434 




Table 5: Granger non-causality test for panel data 
Null hypothesis of HNC hypothesis Wald statistics W_HNC        ̃    
NII does not Granger-cause NPL 1.8809***[0.002] 12.348 10.552 
NPL does not Granger-cause NII 2.7235***[0.000] 24.159 21.307 
Notes: We use 1000 bootstrap replications. P-value computed using 1000 bootstrap replications 
in brackets. For the null hypothesis of NII does not Granger-cause NPLR, 95% critical value of      and  ̃    are 7.6967 and 6.3179 respectively; and for the null hypothesis of NPL does not 
Granger-cause NII, 95% critical value of      and  ̃    are 8.4798 and 7.0309. ***, **, * 






Table 6: Granger-causality in each cross-section unit (bank) 
 
  NII  NPL NPL  NII   NII  NPL NPL  NII 
No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic 
1 1020180 0.0702 1.897 41 1064728   3.8062*   4.8585** 
2 1021682 0.0686 2.2958 42 1066209   8.2881***   7.5990*** 
3 1023239 0.1222 0.3643 43 1066414 0.5996 0.0001 
4 1025309 0.6887   5.2988** 44 1066713 1.3292   3.0395* 
5 1025541   4.5890** 0.0471 45 1068025 0.0441 0.1143 
6 1026801 1.1782   4.0425** 46 1068191 0.1471 0.1226 
7 1027004   5.7078** 0.3496 47 1069778   5.2476**   6.3293** 
8 1027518   6.1251** 0.6431 48 1070345   5.3577** 0.0222 
9 1028533 0.5767 2.0532 49 1070448 0.8887 0.0209 
10 1029334 0.637 0.0404 50 1070569 0.0047 1.0955 
11 1029464 0.4638 1.5222 51 1070756 0.0597 1.1762 
12 1030170   5.8986**   12.6735*** 52 1070765 0.0939   5.7757** 
13 1030947 2.6961 0.4597 53 1070831 0.7815 0.8109 
14 1031449 1.5114 0.8004 54 1071191 0.1909   7.8575*** 
15 1037003 0.2423   3.2880* 55 1071276   4.5532**   2.8493* 
16 1039502   5.6777** 1.7987 56 1071397 2.551   4.6481** 
17 1048812 1.7243 2.6487 57 1071454 1.6405 0.4881 
18 1048894   4.5936** 0.0591 58 1073757 0.522 0.3906 
19 1049341   6.5453** 0.5815 59 1074156   19.1133***   8.5898*** 
20 1050646 0.7314   2.8049* 60 1075612 1.0708   20.0880*** 
21 1050712 0.1093   3.6702* 61 1075694 0.6454   17.4596*** 
22 1050909 2.3504 0.0775 62 1076002   3.2131* 2.3587 
23 1051465 0.7008 0.5052 63 1076262 0.1026 0.0463 
24 1051979   3.7679* 1.8542 64 1076431   6.5710** 1.5623 
25 1052220   4.3422** 0.0161 65 1076600 1.8505   6.3180** 
26 1053272 0.1235 0.1479 66 1076619 0.0074   3.8491** 
27 1053496 0.3943   4.4482** 67 1076673 0.1421   4.3485** 
28 1053580   3.1711*   7.6192*** 68 1079562 0.8647   14.9966*** 
29 1054091 0.0709   3.5468* 69 1080139   7.1939*** 0.2448 
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30 1054514 1.8157 0.178 70 1081239 0.3414 1.8745 
31 1055007 1.1518 1.7212 71 1081314 2.3313 0.3628 
32 1055155 0.0127 2.3403 72 1081538 1.9244 0.1736 
33 1056161 0.4289 0.165 73 1081613 0.0355 1.3102 
34 1057588 1.0456 0.1361 74 1082067   6.8403***   5.8887** 
35 1060627 0.0008   7.9542*** 75 1082777 1.4866 1.0889 
36 1061679 2.3094   7.0495*** 76 1083475   4.5174** 1.3812 
37 1062621 0.0046   5.8056** 77 1083783 0.8368 1.934 
38 1063552 0.0021 0.0906 78 1085170   7.5883***   8.7049*** 
39 1064429 0.0459 0.0039 79 1085255 0.0022 0.1863 







       
    NII  NPL  NPL  NII     NII  NPL  NPL  NII 
No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic 
81 1085572 0.176 0.085 121 1109599 0.4011 0.1535 
82 1086168 1.4632 2.0282 122 1109991 0.1752   15.7886*** 
83 1086270 2.4351 1.9719 123 1115349 0.2171 0.1515 
84 1086533 0.0764   8.0990*** 124 1115385 0.5359   10.9615*** 
85 1086654 2.4092 1.5377 125 1117026   4.6931**   5.9940** 
86 1086748   3.0866* 2.1286 126 1117213   5.7657**   3.9382** 
87 1090987 0.0081 0.0001 127 1117316 1.2677 0.2871 
88 1094314 0.767 0.5938 128 1117464 0.1768 1.0596 
89 1094640 0.0018 1.4594 129 1117491   3.0378* 0.0397 
90 1094828   2.7247*   6.1355** 130 1118238   6.0340** 2.5644 
91 1095254 0.964 1.6889 131 1118265 0.0444 2.0521 
92 1095674 1.0525   14.2981*** 132 1118340 0.0847 0.0799 
93 1096505 1.4237 0.1866 133 1118368   2.7535* 1.9372 
94 1097025 0.4018 1.4572 134 1118434   7.6901*** 0.7661 
95 1097089 0.2211 2.6542 135 1118797 1.2469   3.1361* 
96 1097173   5.7817**   7.5430*** 136 1118854 0.0355 0.2816 
97 1097182 0.9929 0.0329 137 1119383   15.1920*** 1.2977 
98 1097306 0.0009   6.1496** 138 1119404 0.0005 1.9172 
99 1097566 0.3556   2.7402* 139 1119495 0.5579   4.2101** 
100 1097771 0.0139 0.0336 140 1119794   3.1019* 0.3715 
101 1098303 0.2759   5.6216** 141 1120754 1.8255   6.0560** 
102 1098620 0.0371 1.6958 142 1121229   3.9131** 0.791 
103 1098732 0.3941   3.5576* 143 1123193 0.079 2.5929 
104 1098796 0.21 1.7675 144 1123915   3.9495** 0.2211 
105 1099382 0.0122 0.0499 145 1123933 1.0907 0.1952 
106 1099917   6.2231** 1.8671 146 1124060 0.032 0.2191 
107 1100813 1.3534 0.0018 147 1125843   6.8641*** 0.2075 
108 1102312   3.4289*   8.3907*** 148 1126354   6.4559** 2.3615 
109 1102367 0.0408 0.0887 149 1127146 0.3105   4.0005** 
110 1102581 1.9275 0.8221 150 1128358 0.9018   5.3534** 
18 
 
111 1103766 2.2158   9.4637*** 151 1128769 0.0059 0.2737 
112 1103878 0.0636   3.1498* 152 1129533 1.1614 0.2381 
113 1104923 0.0016 0.2902 153 1130098 1.1641 1.9835 
114 1107522 0.9573 0.4804 154 1130584   5.5788** 0.9735 
115 1108163 0.2705   9.0649*** 155 1130931   3.9438** 0.028 
116 1108350 1.5829 0.0744 156 1131077 0.0031 0.0052 
117 1108707 0.1299   4.7179** 157 1131750 0.0119   3.3419* 
118 1109094 0.0009 0.0158 158 1131787 0.4404 0.8015 
119 1109290 0.6512   2.9021* 159 1132104 1.858 0.7528 










    
    NII  NPL  NPL  NII     NII  NPL  NPL  NII 
No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic 
161 1133174 0.3044 0.1843 201 1200692 0.2755 2.0849 
162 1133503 1.086 1.4019 202 1201112   6.0039** 0.3086 
163 1133781 0.5785 1.1216 203 1201457 2.2603 0.3778 
164 1133932 0.0529 2.4389 204 1201925   11.5039*** 0.1353 
165 1134498 1.6992 1.001 205 1201934 1.2651 1.6197 
166 1134630 0.8354 1.772 206 1202052   2.7270*   4.8651** 
167 1134694 0.0019 1.7298 207 1202258 0.0935 1.8754 
168 1135002 0.9198   5.3925** 208 1202762 0.6429 0.6957 
169 1135048 0.112 0.1938 209 1203509 1.1856 1.1912 
170 1135374 0.7074 0.1592 210 1203714 0.0855   15.268*** 
171 1135404 0.1433   4.5757** 211 1203778 0.1019 0.686 
172 1135516   3.4352*   3.9866** 212 1203974 0.5896 1.7916 
173 1135824 1.7648 0.0848 213 1204177 0.0403 2.5621 
174 1136009   3.2944*   3.8051* 214 1204560 0.1675   3.6562* 
175 1136803 2.5692   14.5159*** 215 1204627 0.0222   5.4201** 
176 1137453 0.2632 2.5982 216 1204814 0.4576 2.6292 
177 1137770 1.4074 2.4251 217 1205026 1.8553 2.7378 
178 1138450 0.0017   2.9376* 218 1205183   9.9205***   6.1244** 
179 1138919   4.1044** 2.6785 219 1206546   6.9833*** 0.7746 
180 1139242 0.6442 0.5224 220 1206591 0.6197 0.4274 
181 1139363 0.0001   9.4238*** 221 1206760 0.1854 2.2733 
182 1139532 0.3215 0.5023 222 1206911 0.0001 1.0502 
183 1139925 0.0031   4.1124** 223 1207132 0.6573   3.0961* 
184 1140127 0.7603   5.9200** 224 1207431 0.1961   3.6927* 
185 1140239 0.9758 0.0475 225 1208009 0.4004 1.1147 
186 1140323 0.0107 0.0018 226 1208120 0.3305 0.962 
187 1140994 0.8031 0.4835 227 1208184 1.753 0.0124 
188 1141348 1.1895   6.8424*** 228 1208513 0.3316 0.0456 
189 1141487 0.0434 0.5697 229 1208531 0.1451 0.2319 
190 1141647 0.0213 0.7526 230 1208559   11.6909***   3.2221* 
191 1142242   7.9211***   26.9073*** 231 1208595 0.0091   3.0560* 
192 1142336 0.9779 0.4196 232 1209042 0.8262 1.8802 
193 1142475 0.0008 1.1017 233 1209109   3.8148* 0.8857 
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194 1143623   2.8869* 0.0044 234 1209145   6.6399** 1.4484 
195 1199611 1.2215 0.1699 235 1209181   2.9729* 2.4361 
196 1199844 1.0294 0.2666 236 1209248 0.482 1.2851 
197 1199974 0.005 1.6851 237 1209426 0.1405 0.1366 
198 1200124 1.0991   3.5847* 238 1210066 0.515   9.3365*** 
199 1200311 0.3011 0.2568 239 1210589 0.8315   4.2781** 













    NII  NPL  NPL  NII     NII  NPL  NPL  NII 
No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic 
241 1245291 2.0766 0.0015 281 1842421   13.0770*** 0.7652 
242 1245385 0.2453   8.6369*** 282 1843080 0.4752   16.3388*** 
243 1245705   4.8023**   4.1900** 283 1848003 0.0922   4.5133** 
244 1246252 3.14   4.0813** 284 1860863 0.1309 1.0791 
245 1246467 0.1062 0.0066 285 1862036 1.0069   2.8938* 
246 1246533   3.6817* 0.1719 286 1883693   4.6870** 0.0311 
247 1247428   3.0633* 0.0143 287 1885307   4.1840**   7.4272*** 
248 1247576 0.3316 0.8278 288 1917600 0.7013 0.536 
249 1247679   3.1149*   3.9484** 289 1947045 0.0342 1.0261 
250 1247987   4.1150** 0.0057 290 1951350   7.2644*** 0.7696 
251 1248032 0.6429 0.0301 291 1951770 0.6087   4.5232** 
252 1248078 0.4854   3.8950** 292 1966671 0.036 1.7037 
253 1248153 0.0157   4.0384** 293 1971693 0.0727 0.4962 
254 1248304   7.2026*** 0.7717 294 1978713 0.2856 0.5538 
255 1248845   2.8338* 2.3227 295 1988646 0.0543 2.0041 
256 1248939 0.0041 0.0136 296 1995523 1.4034 0.9797 
257 1249002   4.8108** 0.1824 297 2007647 0.6353 1.5452 
258 1249039 0.958   4.5150** 298 2012315 0.0482   9.8222*** 
259 1249712 0.006 0.7246 299 2033226 0.808 0.9903 
260 1249918 0.8966   7.0061*** 300 2040288 0.8371 1.0884 
261 1250437 0.1508 2.4081 301 2052777 0.0084 1.6561 
262 1250473 0.0488 0.938 302 2066868 0.563   6.2260** 
263 1401109 0.0021 0.0013 303 2067007 1.0612 0.0009 
264 1404687 0.0846 0.9507 304 2078816   6.7813*** 1.0709 
265 1416523 0.9077   7.9503*** 305 2088329 0.0633 0.0471 
266 1417333 0.2074 0.1048 306 2107707 0.1843   3.0679* 
267 1426755 0.0459 0.061 307 2124795 2.1216 0.6313 
268 1427275   4.8211**   3.3386* 308 2126977 2.2035 0.3242 
269 1471849 0.6714 0.1122 309 2128917 0.0634   2.7201* 
270 1471960   22.7016*** 0.004 310 2149622 0.0109   9.8182*** 
271 1478017   3.4490* 0.7077 311 2158156   2.8415* 0.0089 
272 1490701   9.9324***   5.6157** 312 2166124 0.2696 0.0077 
273 1491360 0.3356 2.2664 313 2169871 1.5398 0.6597 
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274 1491409 2.4105 0.9392 314 2176413 1.305   13.7860*** 
275 1493654 1.1191 0.0227 315 2181426   10.5689*** 0.0041 
276 1823345 1.2722 0.0163 316 2217503 1.1034   11.8555*** 
277 1823608 0.3058 1.4136 317 2233950 0.0049 0.2662 
278 1832048 0.7489 1.4431 318 2253529 0.2933 0.5849 
279 1833997 0.6993   4.1072** 319 2256539   5.2371** 0 













    NII  NPL  NPL  NII     NII  NPL  NPL  NII 
No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic No. id Wald statistic Wald statistic 
321 2291624 1.9212   2.9338* 358 2728157 2.6371 0.0891 
322 2291914   6.5131**   7.2277*** 359 2734064 1.7493   6.9017*** 
323 2294812 1.6895 0.0225 360 2734233 2.5281   9.0851*** 
324 2297701 0.0057 0.1856 361 2743235 1.0123   2.7399* 
325 2303910 0.2386   4.3592** 362 2745604 0.4807   6.8278*** 
326 2314327 1.1785   3.0047* 363 2747644 1.5484 1.2873 
327 2320618 0.4507 0.067 364 2748995 0.2847 2.0914 
328 2325350 0.0863 0.6323 365 2759900 2.3431   4.7130** 
329 2336806   2.9634*   6.4654** 366 2781910 0.0149   5.6675** 
330 2337401 1.569 0.3138 367 2787118 0.2552   10.6482*** 
331 2339133 0.055   3.2857* 368 2809560 0.2606 0.3806 
332 2349815 0.4734   5.6700** 369 2810285 0.1833 0.2014 
333 2352226 0.5373 2.1875 370 2818245 2.7042   3.3897* 
334 2352280 1.1199 0.0178 371 2849799   4.4080** 0.9201 
335 2356073 0.8241 0.0482 372 2856377 0.1109   9.3976*** 
336 2367921 0.0001 2.1325 373 2858773 1.8207 0.0043 
337 2389941   2.9794*   8.2608*** 374 2858951 1.7974 0.4 
338 2454380 0.9938 0.2396 375 2868129   14.2874*** 2.2628 
339 2467689 2.5108 0.0029 376 2868950 1.8687 0.0637 
340 2482196 0.0509 0.079 377 2869733 0.7813 1.2872 
341 2497462 0.0377 0.0522 378 2900261 0.52   11.8197*** 
342 2502049 0.89   6.9459*** 379 2907822 2.1348 0.3893 
343 2507790 0.0138 1.605 380 2925657   2.9975*   18.6665*** 
344 2533100 0.7083 0.032 381 2935142 0.8298   4.2556** 
345 2557405 0.5851   3.4553* 382 2942702 1.1009 1.9615 
346 2560263 0.1126   3.2992* 383 2961879   6.5894** 0.438 
347 2568102 0.3129   5.8898** 384 2976396 0.0204 0.1768 
348 2582827 2.3702   14.0266*** 385 3012554 0.5017 1.0065 
349 2592714 1.5582 1.8943 386 3015975 0.2308 2.0965 
350 2618388 2.3961   7.0105*** 387 3025385 0.0187 0.963 
351 2626691 0.777 0.0084 388 3030307 1.2643 0.01 
352 2634490   5.4145** 0.0019 389 3047743   14.2185*** 1.2809 
353 2634696 1.2402 0.3438 390 3098576 0.4143 0.0003 
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354 2652104 0.4207   3.4002* 391 3103603 0.3442 0 
355 2682996 0.0384 0.0118 392 3109904 0.8285 0.0002 
356 2706735 0.0471 2.5069 393 3150997   9.2079*** 2.2264 
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Table 7: Cointegration test: Westerlund test  
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Gt -1.330 -6.737 0.000 
Ga -4.046 -1.062 0.144 
Pt -148.493 -118.549 0.000 
Pa -36.137 -240.408 0.000 
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Table 8: Dynamic OLS estimation  
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
NPL -2.161*(0.921) NII -0.001**(0.000) 
R-squared 0.178 R-squared 0.328 
Notes: standard error is shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
